Henry Ward Johns and C.B. Manville founded Johns Manville.
William Cooke published the first medical paper on asbestosis.
Asbestos industry leaders asked Dr. Anthony Lanza, assistant medical director at Metropolitan Life Insurance, to investigate asbestos disease among asbestos factory workers. The industry concealed results that showed high rates of asbestos-related illness.
P. Klemperer and C.B. Rabin explained diagnosis and pathology of pleural mesothelioma, a cancer affecting the lining of the lungs.
Raybestos-Manhattan and Johns Manville manipulated a study on asbestos textile workers to downplay the seriousness of asbestosis.
Turner & Newall convinced British government officials to limit asbestos regulations and safety inspections.
Lanza objected to hanging asbestos warning signs at a Johns Manville plant in Illinois because of the potential “legal situation.”
London pathologist Steven Gloyne reported a case of lung cancer associated with asbestosis and suggested asbestos as a possible cause for mesothelioma.
Raybestos-Manhattan president Sumner Simpson wrote, “The less said about asbestos, the better off we are,” in a letter to a Johns Manville attorney.
Johns Manville became a world leader in asbestos product sales.
Metropolitan Life blocked a safety inspection at a Johns Manville asbestos factory in New Jersey.
Dr. Kenneth Smith, future medical director of Johns Manville, advised the company against telling its sick workers they have asbestosis.
Irving Selikoff and colleagues uncovered a definitive link between asbestos exposure and cancer.
Asbestos industry leaders claimed they had no knowledge of asbestos health risks prior to 1964, but confidential documents prove otherwise.
In a confidential memo, a Bendix Corporation executive wrote, “If you have enjoyed a good life while working with asbestos products, why not die from it.”
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) classified asbestos as a hazardous air pollutant.
The first asbestos product lawsuit paved the way for thousands of future claims against asbestos companies.
By most accounts, Johns Manville was the largest manufacturer of asbestos products and the leading asbestos supplier in the U.S. from the 1920s to the 1970s. Much of the company’s financial success over this period is attributed to Lewis H. Brown, an innovative businessman named president of the company in 1929.
Brown’s leadership helped elevate Johns Manville to No. 1 in worldwide asbestos product sales by the 1940s. It later came to light that he reached this milestone by placing company profits over the health of his workers, evidenced by countless internal memos, industry letters and courtroom depositions.
Chilling historical image of workers bagging raw asbestos by hand.
In a 1984 deposition describing a meeting between Brown, Johns Manville attorney Vandiver Brown and officials from the asbestos firm Unarco, Charles Roemer recalled Lewis Brown’s callous disregard for his employees’ health.
“I’ll never forget,” Roemer said. “I turned to Mr. Brown, one of the Browns made this crack (that Unarco managers were a bunch of fools for notifying employees who had asbestosis), and I said, ‘Mr. Brown, do you mean to tell me you would let them work until they dropped dead?’ He said, ‘Yes. We save a lot of money that way.’”
Decades earlier in 1949, Dr. Kenneth Smith, a local physician, sent a memo to Johns Manville headquarters concerning seven asbestos mill workers whose chest X-rays showed early signs of asbestosis. Smith advised company executives against sharing the test results with the workers, writing, “As long as the man is not disabled, it is felt that he should not be told of his condition so that he can live and work in peace, and the company can benefit by his many years of experience.”
We now know that Brown took Smith’s advice and made it company policy, leaving sick workers completely uninformed as their health degraded. Brown later hired Smith as medical director of Johns Manville, confirming he shared the doctor’s cruel approach to occupational health.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
While Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was not an asbestos business, it worked closely with asbestos companies to conceal
the health effects of the toxic mineral. In 1944, the company insured more than a dozen big names in the industry, including Johns Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, National Gypsum, Fibreboard and Flintkote.
Early image of an open pit asbestos mining operation.
Metropolitan Life knew about the high asbestosis rates at Johns Manville’s factory in Manville, New Jersey, as early as 1932, but succeeded in blocking an inspection for poor work conditions there in 1945. The company even convinced government officials that asbestos hazards were under control, despite having knowledge of confidential company-sponsored reports that found evidence of asbestosis in 20 percent of workers.
In 1933, a plant physician at a Johns Manville plant in Illinois asked Dr. Anthony Lanza, a full-time employee at Metropolitan Life from 1926 to 1948, about hanging warning posters to spread worker awareness of asbestos-related health risks. Lanza objected because of the potential “legal situation.”
Lanza’s early 1930s study on asbestos workers in the textile industry revealed that half of all workers with five to 10 years of exposure showed signs of asbestosis in X-rays. Of those with more than 15 years of exposure, a remarkable 87 percent suffered from lung disease. The asbestos industry blocked the publication of these findings for four years, and likely altered the data before the report was released.
The Sumner Simpson Papers revealed private conversations that very arguably show a pattern of denial and disease and attempts at suppression of information … It further reflects a conscious effort by the industry in the 1930s to downplay, or arguably suppress, the dissemination of information to employees and the public for the fear of promotion of lawsuits.
South Carolina Circuit Judge
Raybestos-Manhattan has been a leading manufacturer of asbestos-containing textiles, brake linings and other friction products since the 1920s, and continues to do business outside the asbestos industry today. Court documents have revealed the company played a crucial role in the asbestos cover-up, most notably by working with Johns Manville in the 1930s to conceal information about the dangers of asbestos.
A collection of documents known as the Sumner Simpson Papers, named after the president of Raybestos-Manhattan in the 1930s and 1940s, provide clear evidence that the company attempted to hide asbestos health risks from workers and the general public.
Raybestos-Manhattan and Johns Manville in 1932 convinced Lanza of Metropolitan Life to alter his study on asbestos textile workers to minimize the seriousness of asbestosis. Manville and Raybestos allegedly had Lanza remove a sentence from the report explaining, “It is possible for uncomplicated asbestosis to result fatally.”
In a 1935 letter, A.F. Rossiter of Asbestos Magazine implied Simpson had requested he block the publication of articles mentioning asbestos dust hazards. Soon after, Simpson sent a letter to Johns Manville attorney Vandiver Brown. “The less said about asbestos,” he wrote, “the better off we are.”
Bendix Corporation, now known as Honeywell, began manufacturing asbestos friction materials for automobiles in 1939 out of Troy, New York. The company expanded its operations to Cleveland, Tennessee, in 1964 and was still producing asbestos-containing brake components in the U.S. as recently as 1997.
My answer to the problem is: If you have enjoyed a good life while working with asbestos products, why not die from it.
Director of purchases for Bendix Corporation
Ernie Martin, director of purchases for Bendix Corporation, in September 1966 shared an asbestos report with Noel Hendry, a sales manager at a Johns Manville asbestos mine in Quebec, Canada. The report predicted asbestos health risks may lead to undesirable government regulations.
In response, Hendry said, “I suppose we have to bear with people who have nothing better to do than create alarm, but we are not alarmed, and we live and sleep with the stuff.”
While current U.S. regulations limit workplace asbestos exposure to 0.2 fibers per cubic centimeter of air (f/cc), surveys at Johns Manville’s Canadian mine and various other mines and mills throughout Quebec in the 1950s revealed asbestos levels ranging from 23 to 720 f/cc. Clearly, there was cause for alarm.
As more evidence of the dangers of asbestos emerged, Johns Manville’s Asbestos Fiber Division sent a position paper titled "Asbestos and Human Health" to a Bendix manager. The paper stated the asbestos industry had invested millions in industrial hygiene and medical research, but it gave a misleading account of the health risks of asbestos. It featured section titles labeled “An Essential Product” and “No Risk Shown for General Public.”
Turner & Newall, Ltd.
In 1920, four U.K. asbestos businesses merged to form Turner & Newall, one of the first companies to industrialize asbestos. Like many of the major asbestos companies in the U.S., Turner & Newall made repeated efforts to hide asbestos health risks.
Main boiler-house building
While the company held many health and safety conferences, officials did not open the conversations to those unfamiliar with asbestosis, namely workers and their trade unions. Employees at Turner & Newall plants began dying of asbestos exposure in the 1920s, including a young asbestos worker who suffered a massive accumulation of fibers in her lungs. In her autopsy report, a doctor said the collection of fibers was so thick his knife almost appeared to grate as he cut into her left lung.
When the British government announced plans to enact the first regulations on the asbestos industry, Turner & Newall ensured industrial hygiene measures would only apply to manufacturing plants and not the end-use of asbestos products. Laws requiring regular medical examinations for asbestos workers came next, but Turner & Newall convinced the government to exclude asbestos insulation workers from mandatory testing. Besides miners, this group was perhaps the highest risk occupation for asbestos disease.
Once government doctors learned in 1932 that warehouse employees who packed and shipped asbestos products faced serious asbestosis risks, Turner & Newall and several other companies convinced government representatives that regulatory updates to protect these workers weren’t necessary.